By Moncef Fellah

January 20, 2022

The Syrian crisis began in 2011 as an armed conflict involving multiple factions with divergent political and ideological interests, supported by various regional and global powers. At the same time, the Russian Federation, dissatisfied with NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, had strengthened its military capabilities through the 2008 reforms. Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, Russia has consistently provided political, humanitarian, and military support to the Syrian authorities. This support has enabled the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to regain control of significant portions of Syrian territory. The goal of this paper is to examine the reasons explaining the Syrian-Russian alliance, following a historical and regional perspective and focusing on the strategic reasons in relation to the Arab Spring explaining current Russian-Syrian relations. The paper also focuses on the strategic local and regional diplomatic gains resulting from the intervention.

The historical links between Syria and Russia:

During the Cold War, and at the end of the 1950’s, Syria became a close partner of the Eastern bloc, which was followed in the 1960’s by the emergence and the takeover of the Baath Party, allowing the Soviet Union to solidify its influence. Military support increased, trade between the two countries boomed and the Soviet Union assisted the Syrian authorities in its nationalization projects. Syria represented one of the most important partners for Moscow in the Middle East, and it became a vital one when the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat changed Egypt’s foreign policy. As a result, Syria became the de facto main Soviet ally in the Middle East and held that position until 1991.

From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Moscow maintained close relations with Damascus, which was ruled from 1970 until 2000 by Hafez al-Assad. In 1980, the relationship between the two countries became even closer when Moscow and Damascus signed a treaty that provided for consultation in case of a threat to peace and for military cooperation (Trenin-2013).

Since the 1970’s, Syria represents a crucial partner in the defense sector, and the country hosted up to 6,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians as well as civilian personnel and dependents. The collaboration between the two countries also included the economy and education (Trenin-2013).
While Syria and Russia have historically maintained closed relations, it is important to note that there have been a few disputes between the two countries. The main one was when the Syrian army intervened in the Lebanese Civil war in 1991 after Moscow decided to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. However, these disagreements did not impact significantly on the long-term relations between the two countries, which have been influenced by a form of pragmatism.

The strategic importance of the Syrian territory:

Historically, the Syrian territory has always been a coveted land. It was conquered by the Assyrians in 900- 726 BC, then by the Babylonian Empire in 612 BC. A few times later, Cyrus II, founder of the Persian Empire conquered Babylonia, which made Syria under its control. In 301 BC, it was Alexander the Great’s turn to take control of the territory (Poutrel-2020).

Centuries later, the Arabs took control of this region, before getting conquered by the Turkish Empire in the 16th century (without talking about the Mameluke conquests). The Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and the San Remo conference recognized France’s mandate in Syria, a mandate that ended in 1946.
Today, the Syrian territory is still a coveted land, where major regional and global powesr compete to expand their influence. For Russia, one of the strategic reasons explaining its approach in Syria is the fact that its only naval base in the Mediterranean is in Syria, with the Tartus base. Tartus, a Syrian port that was used by the Soviet Navy’s Fifth Mediterranean Squadron during the Cold War, became Russia’s only naval resupply facility outside the former Soviet Union. In fact, in the beginning, this logistic center was only helping the Soviet naval group with repairs and supplies. For a long time, this base consisted of only a few floating berths, outbuildings, and a garrison.

The importance of this base increased gradually, and since its direct intervention in the Syrian conflict in September 2015, Russian activity in the Mediterranean became at an all-time high since 1992 (Research and Information Center-2020).

Strategically, the Tartus naval base is key because under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey has the right to close off Turkish straits that connect the Black and the Mediterranean Sea. Through this, Russia’s access to the Eastern Mediterranean would therefore depend, to some extent, to its relations with Turkey. Therefore, the Tartus base offers Russia a direct access to warm waters, without relying entirely on regional actors.

The case is similar regarding the Hmeimim Airbase which is operated by Russia since September 2015. The base of Hmeimim is the only Russian airbase in the Middle East and allows for power projection across Syria and the Middle East as a whole. These two bases allowed Russia to be a key actor in the Middle East and play a major role in the negotiations involving the Syrian issue.

The influence of the international context and relations with other major players:

The Kremlin’s approach to the region has been influenced by Russia’s broader relations with Western actors, indicating that periods of tension could affect Russia’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean (Kortounov 2021). Applying this logic, Moscow has viewed the Arab Spring as a sequence of regime changes associated with instability, and the potential for the Syrian conflict to evolve into a more radicalized confrontation, similar to the Libyan crisis was a significant concern.

In Libya, the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi that began in February 2011, lead to the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1971 and 1973 in March 2011, which imposed a no-fly zone to protect civilians (with the Russian abstention). These resolutions enabled NATO intervention aimed at countering perceived threats to civilians, which ultimately culminated in the overthrow and assassination of the Libyan leader. Russian authorities have argued that resolution 1973 was exceeded, as it was intended to protect civilians rather than remove the existing government. The subsequent state collapse in Libya and its destabilizing effects on North Africa, the Sahel, and the Mediterranean region have been considered as evidence of the negative consequences of such interventions. This experience significantly influenced Russia’s position regarding international involvement in the Syrian conflict, and the country.

Military actor, mediator, and the evolution of the relationship with regional actors involved in Syria:

Russia’s intervention in Syria enabled Moscow to become a central player in the Middle East, combining the roles of active military actor and mediator. It has played a significant role in regional negotiations, at times acting as their initiator. Despite periods of tension (notably with Turkey in 2015), Russia has maintained constructive relations with key regional actors. A clear example is the Astana Process, launched in 2017 with Turkey and Iran, which sought to end the armed conflict and “jumpstart the convening of the formal political negotiating process” (United Nations, 2017). Russia has also been involved in negotiations over ceasefires and de-escalation zones involving the Syrian Arab Army, Kurdish forces, Turkey, and militant groups. 

It has been argued that Russia has consistently prioritized « order and stability » as central sources of political legitimacy, maintaining deep skepticism toward radical political transformations (Kortunov 2021). Moscow’s positions regarding Egypt (2012–2013) and Libya, where it supported Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar as a committed opponent of extremism, illustrate this stance. Furthermore, Russia’s intervention in Syria served as a direct counter-example to the Libyan crisis. Regionally, this vision of international relations aligns closely with the perspectives of several Arab states, and it could have played a durable role in solidifying Moscow’s relationships with GCC countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, by emphasizing « stability and sovereignty » over « political change and uncertainty. »

Conclusion:

To conclude, Syrian-Russian relations have been influenced by a combination of historical and pragmatic factors and yielded multi-layered strategic dividends: a permanent military foothold, regional diplomatic relevance, and a strengthened narrative of great-power resurgence. The Russian intervention in Syria is the first direct military intervention outside a former USSR republic since the Cold War, and is a sign that it has become an active player in the Middle East. While currently at a stalemate, the Syrian crisis is far from over, as the country’s fragile peace, economic difficulties and infrastructure deficit will be key challenges for reconstruction, political stabilization, and long-term development.

 

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